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Innovation  in electricity  distribution  networks  will be  an impor-
tant element  in the  transition  to  a sustainable  low-carbon  energy
system.  The  nature  of  networks  as regulated  monopolies  means
that  the  locus  of  the  evolution  of  protective  space  for innovation  is
regulatory  institutions,  and  that  the politics  of  creating  protective
space is the  politics  of  institutional  change.  In  this  paper  I examine
the case  of  Britain,  where  protective  space  for research,  develop-
ment  and  demonstration  projects  was  created  over  the course  of
the  2000s  in  the form  of  funding  mechanisms  within  the regulatory
regime.  The  case  study  is  used  to  test  structural  and discursive  theo-
ries  of gradual  institutional  change.  I conclude  that these  theoretical
frameworks  are  consistent  with  the  evidence,  but  that  the  char-
acterisations  of  change  actors  and  of  dominant  policy  paradigms
are  insufﬁciently  ﬂexible.  I also conclude  that  the  framework  for
innovation  in  the  British  regulator  remains  incomplete.
© 2015  The  Author.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an  open
access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
In the analysis of innovation processes for sustainability transitions, the multi-level perspective
(MLP) on socio-technical transitions currently plays a dominant role (Smith et al., 2010). The MLP
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provides the concepts of niches, socio-technical regimes and the wider landscape, with technological
transitions emerging from interactions between these (Kemp et al., 1998; Geels and Schot, 2007;
Geels, 2002, 2010; Smith et al., 2005). Within this framework, the concept of ‘protective space’ in
niches for emergent radical innovations plays a particularly important role (Smith and Raven, 2012).
However, the MLP  approach (and indeed the wider socio-technical transitions literature) has been
widely criticised for a lack of analysis of politics (e.g. Meadowcroft, 2009; Scrase and Smith, 2009; Kern,
2011). This critique then raises the question of exactly how politics should be theorised and brought
into the analysis of sustainability transitions. In this paper, I turn to the approach that has played a
central role in political analysis – institutionalism – to analyse contested ideas and institutional change
in the creation of protective space for innovation in electricity distribution networks in Great Britain.1
The background for such innovation is the anticipated transformation of electricity systems, with
growth in small-scale renewable electricity generation technologies, at least partial electriﬁcation of
heat and transport, and the possibility of greater demand side response. To fully realise the value
of such ‘distributed energy resources’ (Agrell et al., 2013; Ruester et al., 2014), many governments
now take the view that electricity distribution systems will have to be transformed in their ability to
observe and control power ﬂows and quality through the application of information technologies, i.e.
the ‘smart grid’ agenda.
However, the context for innovation in electricity networks is very different from that in competi-
tive markets, where most studies of innovation for sustainability are focused. Considered to be natural
monopolies, networks are either state owned and operated or are heavily regulated. The balance of
risk and reward for regulated companies is determined almost entirely by the nature of the regula-
tory regime, and those companies react to that regime rather than to market opportunities. In Britain,
electricity distribution network companies have historically been seen as risk averse and lacking the
skills, capacity and incentives for innovation (e.g. Smith, 2010).
The history of the smart grid policy agenda and the evolution of regulation for network innovation
in GB have been widely discussed. As Bolton and Foxon (2011) note, innovation was ‘off the agenda’
until the early 2000s. The focus of the GB regulator, Ofgem,2 was on incentivising cost reduction,
largely achieved by network companies by squeezing operational expenditure. However, in 2005
Ofgem introduced two mechanisms to support R&D by electricity distribution network companies, an
approach which was subsequently expanded from 2010. The focus of this paper is on examining the
politics of this pivotal episode of institutional change.
The context for innovation has implications for the way in which the creation of niches and changes
to socio-technical regimes are conceptualised. At least initially, technological niches for networks
have to be created in the most immediate sense by state or regulatory institutions rather than ﬁrms.
As a consequence, the politics of protective space pivots around the politics of change in those insti-
tutions. This fact then drives the selection of a theoretical framework for analysing these politics.
In this paper I draw on two institutional frameworks. One is Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) theory
relating types of institutional change to political context, institutional characteristics and types of
institutional entrepreneurs. The second is John Campbell’s framework for understanding the condi-
tions under which ideas are likely to change institutions. In a study of the introduction of support
for R&D in networks to develop a smarter grid through a change in the British regulatory regime,
the explanatory power of these two frameworks is assessed against evidence obtained from ofﬁcial
documentation and interviews with participants in that change (Annex 1).
I ﬁnd broad support for these two approaches. However, the case study also suggests that the
characterisations of change agents and of policy paradigms in these theoretical frameworks need
to be made more ﬂexible. I also conclude that while the understanding within Ofgem of R&D and
demonstration processes changed signiﬁcantly over the last decade, it is not clear that other aspects
of the innovation process, and in particular the risks associated with moving to business-as-usual
investment, have yet been engaged with.
1 Electricity networks in Northern Ireland are regulated separately from those in the rest of the United Kingdom. This paper
focuses solely on networks in GB (i.e. England, Wales and Scotland).
2 The full name is the Ofﬁce of Gas and Electricity Markets.
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The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, I clarify the nature of the protective space
problem for smart grids in GB, and justify the focus on institutional change within Ofgem. Section
3 introduces the theoretical framework and presents the hypotheses to be explored. In Section 4 I
give an account of the pivotal episode based on interviews with actors playing major roles in the
changes, Ofgem documentation and other sources. Section 5 discusses how far the empirical material
can be explained by the theoretical frameworks and reﬂects back critically on those frameworks. The
conclusion addresses both the nature of the evolution of smart grid policy, and on the analytical project
of introducing political analysis into the study of sustainability transitions.
2. Network innovation and the locus of protective space in Britain
Technological change has been a feature of electricity networks since the original development of
the electricity supply industry from the 1880s onwards (Hughes, 1983). Innovation continued through
the scaling up of generation and the building of high-voltage transmission networks in the period
1930–1950, and into the years of state ownership. In Britain, the Central Electricity Generating Board
supported innovation in networks throughout the 1960s and 1970s, with overall energy R&D rising
from 0.2% of turnover in 1958 to 2.2% in 1989 (Lehtonen and Nye, 2009). However, with privatisation
this picture rapidly changed (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008), and by the early 2000s spending by UK network
companies on RD&D had declined to less than 0.1% of revenue (Pollitt and Bialek, 2008). Distribution
companies in particular were focused on increasing efﬁciency not through technological change but
rather through short-term cost cutting (Bolton and Foxon, 2011: 14).
The collapse in innovation would have slowed long-term efﬁciency gains in networks even if the
electricity system had remained the same. However, by the early 2000s, signs were emerging that
electricity systems were likely to change fundamentally over the coming decades. New renewable
technologies, especially wind, produced generation that varied over time, implying much lower net-
work utilisation rates unless new approaches to planning and operation were adopted. A signiﬁcant
proportion of wind capacity was starting to connect directly to distribution networks,3 followed by
a rapid take-off of distribution-connected solar PV in the late 2000s. However, distribution networks
were not designed to accommodate generation, especially on low voltage parts of the network, and
there were potential challenges of increased fault levels and voltage control (Baker and Chaudry, 2010:
8–9).
At the same time, debates about the role of electriﬁcation in the decarbonisation of transport and
heat were emerging. How far this process will go in the UK is disputed. Initial expectations in govern-
ment about the potential of heat pumps have moderated, and the current heat strategy involves a mix
of electriﬁcation and other low carbon pathways (DECC, 2013). Nevertheless, even partial electriﬁca-
tion implies a substantial increase in electricity demand. Wilson et al. (2013) estimate that shifting
even 30% of heat demand to electricity would mean daily electricity demand doubling if resistive heat-
ing is used, and increasing by 25% if heat pumps are used. Peak demand increases would be larger.
The move to electric vehicles and consequent demand for charging will add to this challenge (Pieltain
et al., 2011). Overall, Pudjianto et al. (2013: 77) estimate that the electriﬁcation of heat and transport
could increase daily electricity use by 50%, while doubling peak demand.
Accommodating these changes using conventional approaches to network design and operation
would require very large investments, especially at low voltage levels. The alternative ‘smart grid’4
approach is to use information and communication technologies (ICT) to actively manage demand and
distributed generation so as to reduce peak power ﬂows, and extend the life and increase the utilisation
of wires, transformers and other equipment by remote monitoring and fault correction (e.g. McDonald,
2008; Strbac et al., 2010; Pudjianto et al., 2013: 77; ECC SC, 2013: 13–14), all of which should reduce
costs by deferring or avoiding the need for network reinforcement or replacement. The smart grid
agenda implies a very different role for distribution network operators. Rather than designing and
3 Deﬁned as 132 kV and below in England and Wales, but now 33 kV and below in Scotland – see below.
4 The smart grid literature is very large. For a recent review of developments in the UK see Xenias et al. (2014). For deﬁnitions
of  smart grids see http://www.smartgrids.eu/ETPSmartGrids and DECC (2009).
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building passive networks with large amounts of headroom,5 they would become system operators,
monitoring power ﬂows, anticipating faults and managing demand peaks by communicating with
distributed generators, storage devices, heat pumps, electric vehicles and appliances through smart
meters, sending appropriate price signals or allowing automated control.
The smart grid agenda implies not only major technological innovation but also organisational
change (Shaw et al., 2010; Cary, 2010; Agrell et al., 2013; Ruester et al., 2014). It involves a huge
increase in the number of active participants in the electricity system, and in its complexity (IET,
2013: 7). By contrast, since privatisation distribution network operators (DNOs) have been largely
uninnovative and risk averse (Ofgem, 2009a: 21; Sansom, 2010; Shaw et al., 2010: 5928). As late as
2010, a senior Ofgem ﬁgure stated that “it would be crude but not an unrealistic simpliﬁcation to say
that the way energy networks are designed, built and operated has not changed signiﬁcantly since
they were built in the post war period” (Smith, 2010: 9).
The ultimate causes of this problem, however, lay not with the network companies themselves but
with the regulatory regime. Known as RPI-X, post-privatisation network regulation was  designed to
provide an incentive to bear down on costs within each 5 year price control period, through capping
the revenue that DNOs could collect but allowing them to keep a portion of any cost savings that could
be made. There are a number of reasons that this regime did not incentivise longer-term technolog-
ical and organisational innovation.6 There was no driver for companies to develop new technologies
as long as the costs of existing technologies were funded within the regulatory framework, and as
regulated monopolies they did not face competition. Many of the potential beneﬁts of innovation on
networks would accrue to consumers, suppliers, and owners of distributed generation, yet it was  net-
work companies who would have to invest to realise those beneﬁts. Moreover, any expected beneﬁts
of innovation may  not accrue for some time. Not only may  such beneﬁts be heavily discounted, but if
they occurred mainly in future price control periods, companies faced the risk that their investments in
innovation would not be judged to be efﬁcient and so would be disallowed from inclusion in approved
expenditure.
The fact that DNOs have been essentially reactive in their strategies and that incentives for innova-
tion are so bound up with the regulatory regime makes the regulatory institution the primary focus for
understanding the politics of niche creation (Bolton and Foxon, 2011). While contestations over niches
in competitive contexts are typically networks of actors supporting different technologies and vying
with each other for the beneﬁts of protective space (Smith and Raven, 2012), in the case of network
innovation the struggle has been not so much about which technology gets protection as whether
there is any protective space at all.
In some other European countries, debates on smart grids have been institutionally more dispersed,
with concepts such as local semi-autonomous micro-grids beginning to play an important role (see
e.g. Blanchet, 2015 for the case of Berlin). However, this has not been so evident in Britain. Micro-grids
made up one element in Ofgem’s 2008 Long-term Electricity Network Scenarios (LENS) study and in
some technical studies carried out in the mid-2000s (Abu-Sharkh et al., 2006), but these have not
been followed up in any major way. The micro-grid concept is mentioned only in passing even by civil
society enthusiasts for a decentralised, smarter network (Greenpeace, 2005; Willis, 2006). While this
may change in future, the main focus of debate on network innovation in Britain has remained ﬁrmly
on the role of regulation and the relationships between regulator and DNOs.
This contrast with other countries may  be related to differences in the size and ownership of
networks. In GB, there are 14 large distribution network operators owned by 6 parent companies, with
an additional 5 tiny independents, mainly representing private wire networks in new developments.
There is only a handful of micro-grids, including those on Scottish islands (Eigg, Shetlands) – see Ward
and Phillips (2014). By contrast, some other European countries have a large number of relatively
small electricity distribution operators. Germany stands out, with 869 distribution operators in 2012,
5 Sometimes characterised as a ‘ﬁt-and forget’ approach (e.g. Shaw et al., 2010: 5930).
6 By the late 2000s, these issues were widely recognised in the academic and industry literature (e.g. ENA, 2009a; IET, 2009;
Bolton and Foxon, 2011; Smart Grid GB, 2012; Sansom, 2010; Ruester et al., 2014: 3) and also by Ofgem (2009b). However, this
was  not the case in the early 2000s.
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of which 794 had fewer than 100,000 customers (Pérez-Arriaga et al., 2013). But Spain, the Czech
Republic, Sweden, Italy, France, Poland and Austria each have over 100 distribution network operators,
and Finland and Denmark are not far behind. Some of these networks are owned by municipalities or
even cooperatives of consumers. This scale of ownership ﬁts the concept of micro-grids more naturally.
3. Theorising the politics of institutional change
The analysis of innovation for sustainability transitions is currently dominated by the literature on
socio-technical transitions (STT), and especially the multi-level perspective (MLP) on such transitions
(Smith et al., 2010). This literature, emerging from the sociology of technology and innovation studies,
is useful in its emphasis on the ways in which technological systems are embedded in wider social
institutions and practices, and in its distinction between incumbent socio-technical ‘regimes’, ‘niches’
in which innovation is nurtured and wider ‘landscape’ factors. However, it has also been widely criti-
cised for a lack of analysis of politics (Meadowcroft, 2009, 2011; Smith et al., 2005; Shove and Walker,
2007; Fouquet, 2010; Kern, 2011). This critique then raises the question of exactly how politics should
be theorised and brought into the analysis of sustainability transitions.
A range of different attempts to do this have been put forward within the socio-technical transition
literature. Meadowcroft (2009, 2011) – who mainly focuses on the absence of politics in STT rather than
providing an alternative framework – has a short discussion of the importance of democratic political
processes as a way of building legitimacy for sustainability transitions, while Ulmanen et al. (2009) use
Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework, Kern adopts a discursive-institutionalist framework, Smith
and Raven (2012) also draw heavily on the concept of discourse but as developed in organisational
studies and Geels (2014) prefers a neo-Gramscian approach to political economy.
This has produced an interesting variety of approaches to political analysis, although it is not always
clear why exactly the chosen framework and not another is being adopted in any particular case.
To an extent this heterogeneity reﬂects the range of potential political, sociological and organisa-
tional theories available, but it may  also reﬂect the fact that different authors are focusing on different
parts of the socio-technical transitions model. Thus some are trying to account for the politics of regime
transformation as a whole (Meadowcroft, Smith et al., Geels), while others, more relevantly for this
study, are focusing on the creation and development of ‘niches’ for new technologies and practices.
These different scales or levels of analysis matter; while niche creation and development form part of
regime transformation, the level and type of politics involved at this scale differs from that involved
‘at the point of committing large scale public resources to particular technologies or tilting policy to
favour particular approaches’ (Meadowcroft, 2009: 336).
Amongst recent papers focusing on the politics of niche creation, Ulmanen et al. (2009) and
Smith and Raven (2012), while differing in the language used, do share some common theoretical
elements. Both studies contrast the technocratic nature of the STT-inﬂuenced strategic niche man-
agement approach with the fact that in practice ‘ideas for how protective space ought to operate
soon encounter confounding and conﬂicted realities’ (Smith and Raven, 2012: 1031). Both studies
emphasise the importance for niche creation of the efforts of groups of actors (‘advocacy coalitions’ in
Ulmanen et al. and ‘actor networks’ in Smith and Raven). Finally, both also focus on the importance
of the use of ideas in political strategies for achieving institutional reforms that create and empower
niches (‘discourse’ in Ulmanen et al. and ‘narratives’ in Smith and Raven).
These frameworks are useful, but remain at quite a general level. Here I seek to adapt them to
make them more speciﬁc to the institutional context. First, on the role of ideas in niche creation, few
would disagree with Ulmanen et al.’s (2009) statements that “discourses are a resource for advocacy
coalitions to articulate problems, put pressure on regimes, and promote solution” and “those who
control the dominant discourse can control the direction of change” (p. 1407). However, to understand
this process more fully we should be interested in the institutional conditions under which a particular
attempt to do this sometimes fails and sometimes succeeds. Kern (2011), for example, develops such
an approach in a comparative study of system innovations in the UK and the Netherlands. Here, as
discussed below, I adopt an existing framework for analysing the role of ideas in institutional change
from the neo-institutionalist literature.
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A second issue concerns the characterisation of actors. The role of networks or coalitions of actors
both inside and outside of governments is clearly important in niche creation in many cases. However,
in the case of niche creation for electricity networks in Britain in the early 2000s, as discussed below
in Section 4, change was largely due to a single actor within the regulatory institution, and even
in the late 2000s networks advocating more support for R&D were small and relatively weak, with
change again being driven from within the regulator. I would argue that this situation is primarily
due to the regulated nature of electricity network companies, since they lack an incentive to form
advocacy coalitions for niche creation. While others, especially ICT ﬁrms in the supply chain and
environmental NGOs, did advocate for R&D support, especially by the second half of the 2000s, this
coalition was relatively weak and poorly organised, mainly because the attention of its members was
mainly elsewhere (NGOs on coal-ﬁred power generation and the ICT industry on smart metres).7
Moreover, the coalition was in a structurally weak position for institutional reasons, since it is harder
for external groups (other than the regulated industry itself) to lobby an independent regulator than a
government. The overall point here is the need to allow for a greater range of types of potential actors
in the analysis of niche creation.
This review of the uses of political theory in the STT literature points to the desirability of justifying
theory selection by its relevance to the problem being studied and by its explanatory power. My
starting point for theory selection is to note, as discussed above, that the creation of protective space
for network innovation in Britain is essentially a problem of institutional change in the regulatory
regime. This suggests looking to the body of institutionalist theory that plays a central role in modern
political analysis (Peters, 2012), and in particular how such theory has sought to explain change.
A second point is to characterise the institutional change in Ofgem over the 2000s that led to the
creation of a new space for R&D in electricity networks as essentially incremental. As discussed in more
detail below, in creating a technological niche for network innovation, actors in Ofgem did not sweep
away the core of the previous regulatory regime but rather added new elements to it. To some extent,
this will always be true of niche creation, precisely because this process is only a potential precursor
to regime change. Early institutionalist theorising saw institutions as heavily path dependent and
fundamentally stable, an idea that is familiar in the case of sustainable energy in the form of ‘carbon
lock-in’ (Unruh, 2000). In such approaches change can occur only as the result of exogenous shocks or
crises (Kingston and Caballero, 2009; Peters, 2012: 62–63), which again is a familiar theme from the STT
and MLP  literature. However, it has been increasingly recognised that much important institutional
change happens incrementally (e.g. Streeck and Thelen, 2005) and that much of this more gradual
institutional change is endogenous in nature, with internal institutional actors playing central roles
(Battilana et al., 2009). The form of change observed in the regulatory regime for electricity networks
takes a form that has been characterised as ‘layering’, i.e. the addition of new rules on top of or alongside
existing ones, rather than other kinds of change that involve displacement or neglect of rules (Streeck
and Thelen, 2005; Beland, 2007).
The question then arises as to why institutional change took the form of layering in this case.
Mahoney and Thelen (2010) offer a theory that addresses this question.8 First, drawing on Tsebelis’s
(2002) notion of veto points, they argue that if incumbent actors in an institution have strong veto
possibilities, they are more likely to be able to resist both external and internal pressures for change
that completely displaces existing institutional goals and rules (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 18–19). It
is precisely in such contexts that one would expect to see layering rather than displacement. Second,
they argue that the nature of institutional change will also depend on the degree to which actors in
an institution have discretion in how they interpret and enforce institutional rules (Mahoney and Thelen,
2010: 21–22). In situations where there is a lot of discretion, a gap can open up between formal rules
and enforcement, leading to a mode of institutional change identiﬁed as ‘drift’. However, layering
involves the development of new rules rather than new interpretations of existing ones, so it will be
7 This analysis is based on the author’s experience of working in the Department of Energy and Climate Change in 2009–2010
and  interacting with Ofgem, the ICT industry and NGOs.
8 Kern and Howlett (2009) also offer a framework for explaining why  particular forms of gradual institutional change occur,
in  terms of instruments and goals. Here I choose Mahoney and Thelen’s framework as it is both more complete and includes
consideration of the types of actor involved.
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the likely form of change where the implementation of institutional rules is controlled more tightly.
Finally, they consider how modes of institutional change may  be associated with different types of
change agent (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 22–27). They argue that layering will tend to be associated
with actors who seek to change the institution in which they are located, but ‘in pursuing this goal
they do not themselves break the rules of an institution.’ (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 25). Instead they
tend to work by biding their time and encouraging the promotion of new rules on top of existing ones.
Change agents of this type are labelled ‘subversives’. Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 29–31) go on to argue
that such agents are likely to ‘work on their own, behind the scenes or in the shadows’, rather than
forming coalitions for change with institutional challengers or indeed with institutional incumbents.
Mahoney and Thelen’s framework offers not only speciﬁc testable explanations about the form of
change, but also introduces an additional level of analysis of the role and agency of actors. However, it
has one major lacuna, which relates to the role of ideas in institutional change. As noted above, there
is a justiﬁed interest in the socio-technical transitions literature in how actors deploy ‘discourse’ or
‘narratives’ to try to create protective space, and any theory of institutional change should also address
this issue. However, as discussed above such discursive concepts are very broad and their use in much
of the theory deployed in the socio-technical transitions literature remains underdetermined. In this
context, Campbell (1998, 2004: 90–123) offers a useful framework for distinguishing different types
of ideas based on two conceptual distinctions: whether ideas are normative or cognitive, and whether
ideas are used strategically in the foreground of decision making or are present in the background as
assumptions. This approach produces a four-fold categorisation. First are cognitive ideas in the fore-
ground of decision-making, which Campbell calls ‘programs’ and deﬁnes as ‘concepts . . . that enable or
facilitate decision-making . . . by specifying . . . how to solve speciﬁc problems’ (Campbell, 2004: 98).
Programs are typically the key dependent variable in institutional change because they determine
most directly how institutions change. Second are normative ideas in the foreground of decision-
making, which Campbell labels ‘frames’. Frames are used by policy elites or by advocacy groups to
legitimise programs and changes to their target constituents. What many socio-technical theorists
call ‘discourses’ or ‘narratives’ would fall into this category. A third set of ideas are cognitive ideas
that take the form of background assumptions constraining the range of programs that are acceptable
or available, which Campbell, following Hall (1993), calls ‘paradigms’. Finally, ‘public sentiments’ are
background normative assumptions (what some might call ‘ideologies’) which determine the range
of programs that decision makers are likely to perceive as acceptable to society.
Given that endogenous institutional change must involve programs in the most proximate sense,
the question is then what makes it possible for institutional change agents to successfully put forward
programs. Campbell (2004: 115) argues ﬁrst that ‘ideas . . . matter most for institutional change under
conditions of great uncertainty’ (emphasis in the original), especially in a perceived crisis. He argues
that a key factor in shaping perceptions of events is the interactions that actors have with others.
Given the perception of crisis or uncertainty at senior levels in an institution, a number of conditions
must then be in place for new programs to be taken up. First, the program must be credible to decision
makers in the sense that it ﬁts their dominant paradigm.9 Second, policy makers must believe that
the new program being offered is effective ‘insofar as it promises a reasonable solution to a decision-
making problem’ (Campbell, 2004: 118). Finally, ‘if decision makers perceive that an idea is effective
. . . then they must also deem it legitimate,’  i.e. it must be seen as resonating with prevailing public
sentiments and it must be famed in ways that allow decision makers to legitimise it with constituents.
Taken together, Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of gradual institutional change and Campbell’s
hypotheses about the conditions under which ideas can inﬂuence institutional change provide the
framework for the analysis below. In the next section, I provide an account of the initial creation of
a regulatory mechanism of support for network R&D and its subsequent expansion, based mainly on
ofﬁcial documentation and interviews with key participants and industry observers (Annex 1). In Sec-
tion 5, I then assess how far the theoretical arguments made above are supported by the evidence
from these two episodes.
9 Some crises are so extensive, deep and long that they call into question entire policy paradigms (Hall, 1993), but these are
relatively rare episodes of major change involving ‘critical junctures’.
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4. The politics of niche creation: from the IFI to the LCNF
4.1. The Innovation Funding Incentive and Registered Power Zones
In 2000, support to innovation was not on the agenda at Ofgem (Bolton and Foxon, 2011). However,
by 2004, two new mechanisms creating dedicated funding pots for R&D and deployment trials had
been set up. One was the Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI), covering ‘all aspects of distribution system
asset management’ (Ofgem, 2004: 48), which was  capped at 0.5% of allowed revenue and available
on a use-it-or-lose-it basis. Ofgem allowed 90% of the costs of IFI projects to be recovered in the ﬁrst
year of the price control, but this tapered off through the period to 70% in the ﬁfth year, in order
to incentivise early take up. The second mechanism was  Registered Power Zones (RPZs) – a scheme
aimed at demonstrating innovative solutions for the connection of new distributed generation (DG) on
sections of network. DNOs were allowed additional revenue for each kW of DG connected, capped at a
total of £500,000 per DNO per year. These mechanisms were small in relation to the size of total spend
by DNOs, but they created a new niche of activity that led subsequently to a much larger scheme.
By the late 1990s, the regulatory regime for networks invented at the end of the 1980s was ﬁrmly
established and largely seen as successful. The group that was  most dissatisﬁed with the regime com-
prised developers of decentralised electricity generation, who were marginalised and received poor
service from the distribution companies. Two successive working groups10 bringing together Ofgem
staff with a decentralised generation actor network were formed from the late 1990s onwards (see
e.g. EGWG, 2001), but these working groups had little effect, and did not lead to technological or oper-
ational change. Instead, the origins of the IFI and RPZs lie with the arrival of a new Technical Director
in 2001, an engineer with a background in distribution networks in the pre-privatisation period, who
sat on Ofgem’s senior management team.11 Early meetings with DNOs revealed a “complete collapse
of any form of R&D”12 relative to the situation in the late 1980s. Companies were squeezing spending
on R&D as an activity that had a relatively high risk and no certainty of returns within the regulatory
period, with the likelihood that any high returns realised would quickly be clawed back, and which
often involved going against established competitive procurement rules.
The diagnosis implied a change in the regulatory framework that could address some of these
problems. However, this idea was immediately very “contentious” inside Ofgem, creating considerable
“tensions” with the dominant group of economists.13 The markets group in the organisation were
“purist” in outlook, i.e. taking the ‘Austrian’ view that the cost-reducing incentives created by RPI-X
should be sufﬁcient in themselves to drive innovation in a similar way to market competition (Helm,
2003: 59). These economists worked with a simpliﬁed, ‘black-box’ view of innovation, which they
saw as primarily supply-push; innovation would be undertaken by electrical engineering supply ﬁrms
and DNOs would use new products if they were good. Above all, they regarded Britain’s adoption of
incentive regulation (in contrast to the rate-of-return regulation prevalent at the time) as “leading
the world”, and were strongly opposed to any interventions that amended or blunted the incentive
structure, seeing these almost as “breaking the faith”.14
Other economists in Ofgem took a more pragmatic view, and became convinced that the decline in
R&D activity was a real problem. This group was more open to trying some form of support mechanism
on a temporary basis and seeing how it affected R&D activity. However, the issue was  so divisive at
management level that no agreement could be reached. The Head of Networks then decided to refer
the issue up to Ofgem’s governing body, the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, as a way  of resolving
the issue.15 At the Authority level, while the pragmatic view prevailed, there was still strong dissent
10 The Embedded Generation Working Group which operated up to 2001 and the Distributed Generation Coordination Group,
which succeeded it.
11 Interviews 1, 2 and 4.
12 Interview 4.
13 Interviews 2 and 4.
14 Interview 4.
15 ibid.
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from some. Giving evidence on the schemes to the Energy and Climate Change Select Committee some
years later, one DNO chief executive noted that:
‘It was  a huge change four years ago when the authority approved any form of mechanism for
innovation . . . A lot of water has ﬂowed under the bridge since then, but at that time there were
mixed views and great caution among some senior members of the authority. Some people
were very hawkish, asking why they should be doing it . . .’  (Phil Jones in oral evidence to ECC
SC (2010: Ev58)).
The tensions at senior level and the fact that the case for new mechanisms had only just prevailed
were reﬂected in the ambivalence of the language in the decision document for the 2005–2010 price
control:
‘Ofgem has . . . considered whether there is reason to suspect market failure in respect of R&D
funding by DNOs. While this is not clear cut, it is possible that the regulatory system is perceived
to be such that it undermines the commercial incentive to R&D that the patent system provides
in other sectors’ (Ofgem, 2004: 48).
In designing the R&D mechanisms, there was a need to engage and negotiate with the economists
in Ofgem. A central concern was that companies would take advantage of the risk-mitigation that
the mechanisms offered, and would simply take the revenue while not actually undertaking useful
R&D.16 Two steps were taken to address this concern: the Electricity Networks Association was asked
to prepare an IFI Good Practice Guide,17 and public reporting on funded activity using a prescribed
format was required. Input into the design of the mechanisms also came from informal meetings with
senior engineering staff in the DNOs and a relationship with a contact in a large electrical engineering
manufacturing ﬁrm.
Once launched, the IFI quickly produced a response. Spending by DNOs under the IFI increased
from around £2 million in 2003/04 to around £12 million in 2008 (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008: 313),
implying that there had been a back-log of R&D waiting to be done.18 Spending then plateaued to
2011 and then declined as the successor LCNF scheme came in (see below). Positive feedback came
not only from engineers but also from the senior management of DNOs and also internally from parts
of Ofgem, including the Sustainable Development division established in 2009. By contrast, there was
less take-up of the RPZs, with only a handful of schemes materialising in the price control period
(Woodman and Baker, 2008: 4529; Bolton and Foxon, 2011: 17).
4.2. The Low Carbon Network Fund
The Technical Director left Ofgem in 2007, and the post was abolished, leaving no engineering
representation at senior management level.19 However, in 2010 a new mechanism for R&D and demon-
stration projects was introduced in the ﬁfth distribution price control review, the Low Carbon Network
Fund (LCNF). This was a competitive mechanism that allowed DNOs to bid for up to £500 million over
5 years (Ofgem, 2010), equivalent to 2.3% of allowed revenue, an order of magnitude larger than the
IFI and a very substantial increase on levels of R&D spend a decade previously. It was closer to the
RPZ concept than the IFI in that was aimed primarily at demonstration projects rather than basic R&D.
There were two ‘tiers’ of funding, one allowing DNOs to recover most of the costs of smaller projects
in allowed revenue, and another for larger projects in the form of a competitive fund of £64 million a
year. Tier 2 funding requires DNOs to cooperate with ICT ﬁrms, suppliers, generators and consumers in
projects. Essentially the same structure for RD&D funding will be continued into the next price control
period (2015–2023).
16 ibid.
17 For the guide for electricity distribution networks see: http://www.energynetworks.org/electricity/engineering/research-
and-development/innovation-in-electrical-distribution-networked-systems-a-good-practice-guide.html.
18 IFI funding went to a wide range of projects. See http://www.smarternetworks.org/Project.aspx?ProjectID=737#downloads
for  full reports.
19 Interviews 1 and 4.
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The external and internal contexts for the LCNF were quite different from those at the start of the
decade. Public concern about and media interest in climate change had grown sharply from 2004
onwards, culminating in the publication of the Stern Review in 2007 and the passage of the Climate
Change Act, the consequent creation of the Climate Change Committee and the new Department of
Energy and Climate Change in 2008. The now-defunct Sustainable Development Commission pub-
lished a critical evaluation of Ofgem in 2007 which questioned whether the regulator had ‘kept pace
with the climate change imperative and whether the government framework within which it operates
is ﬁt for the challenge of moving to a completely decarbonised electricity system by 2050’ (SDC, 2007:
6–8). There were calls by academics and think-tanks to increase the scale of funding (e.g. Pollitt and
Bialek, 2008), to allow more collaboration across the value chain, with consumers, suppliers and ICT
companies (Cary, 2010) and to do more to ensure that technical innovations developed under funding
mechanisms were mainstreamed into investment programs (Bolton and Foxon, 2011). A Parliamen-
tary Committee report called for a ‘fundamental rethink’ of the regulatory regime (ECC SC, 2010: 16).
Successive governments also made several changes to the remit of Ofgem through legislation or guid-
ance over the 2000s, intended to increase the attention given to climate change and decarbonisation
of the energy system.
Within Ofgem, senior managers were increasingly reﬂecting critically on RPI-X.20 The successes
of cost reduction were celebrated, but the new concern was the need for investment in increasingly
ageing networks, as well as the expectation that electricity networks would see increasing amounts of
small scale distributed generation connected. There was a perceived need to specify more clearly the
quality of service that network companies should be delivering as part of the “regulatory settlement
as a contract”.21 Following work on a regulatory framework for the roll out of smart metres, to be
implemented by energy suppliers, Ofgem was also increasingly paying attention to the opportunity
and need to modernise networks and the importance of accelerating innovation in network planning
and operation. Finally, those working on price control reviews saw that separate and different incen-
tives schemes for opex and capex led DNOs to favour capital heavy solutions to network problems,
potential distorting attempts to introduce smarter approaches.
As a result of these concerns, a major review of the regulatory framework (known as RPI-X@20)
was launched by the Chief Executive in 2008 (Buchanan, 2008). This review ran alongside the devel-
opment of the ﬁfth price control review for electricity networks (DPCR5) and the partner running that
review met  regularly with the RPI-X@20 team. RPI-X@20 led in 2011 to the formation of a new regula-
tory regime for networks called ‘RIIO’ (standing for Revenue = Incentives + Innovaton + Outputs). This
regime introduced a number of changes, but remained the basic structure of revenue cap regulation
at its core.
Against this backdrop, proposals for an expanded innovation support scheme came from within
the price control review team,22 but also from an external Consumer Challenge Group set up in July
2008 as a ‘critical friend’ in the newly created Sustainable Development division.23 These proposals
recognised the precedent set by the IFI and RPZs, but in the new context, these were now viewed
even within Ofgem as too tentative, too small and too focused on research projects divorced from
business-as-usual network investment. In the words of one interviewee: “we  needed a vehicle for
risk-free learning and bringing it into BAU [business as usual]”.24
Two changes were seen as necessary to move DNOs further through the innovation process and
engage them in learning-by-doing. One was to push them to be more outward looking by requiring
bids for LCNF funding to include partnerships with suppliers, ICT ﬁrms, local communities and uni-
versities. Indeed the original vision was that any organisation could apply for LCNF funding, not just
DNOs. However, this approach proved to be legally problematic,25 and DNOs remain the doorkeep-
ers for R&D support. In this sense, while the LCNF allowed DNOs to explore the possibility of new
20 Interview 5.
21 Interview 6.
22 ibid.
23 Interview 3.
24 Interview 6.
25 Interview 5.
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commercial relationships as well as new technologies, it did not open up protective space for innova-
tion in institutional arrangements for providing networks services. Such innovation was  suggested in
the RPI-X@20 review (Pollitt, 2009), but was  quickly criticised by the network industry (ENA, 2009b:
11). Competition for network services remains restricted to new network extensions, and there are
only a handful of tiny independent DNOs at present.
The second change was to radically scale up the funding available. In the words of one interviewee,
the scheme had to be sufﬁciently “juicy” and “super-charged” to engage the attention of the boards of
DNOs rather than just engineering staff, and overcome the reluctance of companies to devote resources
to non-core activities.26 However, precisely because of the big increase in scale of funding and because
Ofgem staff were now using “explicit language and rhetoric around failure”27 in thinking about the
innovation process, there was a considerable amount of scrutiny and challenge from GEMA. Their
concerns included not only risk being borne by consumers but also the possibility that the competition
element could lead to legal challenge, state aid issues and the assignment of intellectual property
rights.28 Ofgem staff had to go back to the Authority on several occasions before getting ﬁnal approval
for the scheme.
The LCNF has led to a step change in levels of R&D activity, and especially larger sale demonstration
projects by companies. The Fund has accelerated learning and networking processes, and its require-
ment for the sharing of knowledge gained from trials has led to a website29 and an annual conference,
which is now a major event attracting several hundred participants. There is some evidence that it
has also a signiﬁcant effect on DNO thinking and culture, albeit varying between companies.30 It has
required DNOs to work together with suppliers, ICT ﬁrms, renewable generators and consumers on
concrete demonstration projects. It has engaged network company board level interest in the smart
grid agenda, and made DNOs aware of potential new commercial relationships and opportunities (for
example, in demand response). However, whether the LCNF will actually lead to major changes in
network investment and operation more widely remains to be seen. In their business plans for the
new price control period to 2023, DNOs expect that savings from smart grid solutions against BAU
approaches will lead to savings equivalent to less than 2% of allowed revenue (Ofgem, 2013). Ofgem
has in turn said they will expect DNOs to realise roughly double this level of savings.
5. Discussion
How far are the events narrated in Section 4 consistent with the associations proposed by the
theoretical frameworks outlined in Section 3? In the creation of new mechanisms for RD&D in Ofgem,
institutional change has taken the form of ‘layering’, that is, the addition of new rules and objectives
on top of existing ones. Thus support mechanisms for R&D have been added to rather than replaced
incentive regulation. Such a pattern of change can also be found in other aspects of the evolution
of network regulation, such as the introduction of new rules on output incentives or stakeholder
engagement, which have been layered on top of the basic efﬁciency incentive. Even the move from
RPI-X to RIIO retained the underlying model for cost minimisation at its core.
In Mahoney and Thelen’s framework, institutional change is more likely to take the form of lay-
ering where the political context involves strong veto possibilities and where actors in an institution
have less discretion in the interpretation and implementation of rules. The relationship between the
electricity regulator and government at the point of its creation in 1989 was  heavily inﬂuenced by the
values of ‘club’ governance that dominated the British political, professional and civil service elites
for most of the 20th century, i.e. discretion, limited public accountability and self-governance (Moran,
2003: 105–06). In the ﬁrst electricity regulator there was  an individual Director General and broad
26 Interview 6.
27 Interview 5.
28 Interview 6.
29 http://www.smarternetworks.org/index.aspx.
30 Deasley et al. (2014: 29) report increased staff resources being allocated to innovation and organisational changes in UK
Power  Networks, for example.
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powers subject to a ‘light touch’ legal framework. As a 2011 government review noted, the speciﬁca-
tion of Ofgem’s duties has been “intentionally broad to allow the regulator ﬂexibility” (DECC, 2011:
24) and this of course ﬁts with the general approach of regulatory independence. Despite successive
changes to the regulator’s remit and duties, this relationship effectively leaves Ofgem to interpret
policy, including trade-offs between policy objectives, in the way  it chooses. Government can give
guidance to Ofgem, but this guidance has “weak legal status” (DECC, 2011).
This relationship gives senior staff in the regulator considerable possibilities for veto. Successive
governments did apply political pressure to Ofgem over the 2000s to take the low-carbon imperative
more seriously, but they could not directly instruct or micro-manage an independent regulator. This
is indeed why a series of changes to duties and guidance were introduced, as each in turn was seen
to be ineffective. Arguably even Ofgem’s major regulatory review in RPI-X@20 was  driven more by
internal concerns than by external demands (the government in fact hardly engaged either with the
review or with DPCR5). Even when Ofgem has been under pressure from government to address
a particular issue, it has retained the power to decide how it will do so. In terms of Mahoney and
Thelen’s central point, it is certainly the case that political pressure from governments, Parliament or
other external actors cannot overcome Ofgem’s veto on retaining what it sees as its core functions and
rules, meaning in turn that these cannot be swept away and replaced with new ones. Only a dissolution
and reinvention of the institutional relationship could do this.
By contrast with this high degree of discretion in the relationship between government and regula-
tor, the aim of the architect of the system in the 1980s, Stephen Littlechild, was  to get rid of discretion in
the application of regulation. Littlechild rejected the American ‘rate of return’ (RoR) regulatory model,
which he saw as providing no incentive for improving efﬁciency, in favour of RPI-X. However accord-
ing to Moran (2003: 105), he was also sceptical of RoR regulation because it required the regulator
to exercise discretion in making a detailed assessment of the asset base of the regulated companies
and assessing what a ‘fair’ rate of return is, both of which open the regulator to capture. RPI-X reg-
ulation, by contrast, involves set methodologies and rules, for example for benchmarking company
performance, assessing efﬁcient investment, adding to the asset base, and setting the allowed cost of
capital. While a degree of discretion was inevitable at some stages,31 it is generally hard for actors in
Ofgem to depart signiﬁcantly from rules in most areas. Certainly, it would have been hard for actors
in Ofgem to create signiﬁcant support for R&D simply through bending the rules and incentives for
expenditure. This implies that such support would need new rules in addition to the existing ones, i.e.
layering.
Within this structural context, the agency and use of ideas by institutional actors or entrepreneurs
then become important. The Technical Director of Ofgem in the early 2000s was the key institutional
entrepreneur in the introduction of new rules for support to R&D. While he wanted to see change, he
also wanted to preserve the wider regulatory institution, and believed in the basic efﬁciency incentive
provided by RPI-X. He also sought to bring in new rules, as bending existing ones was not an option. In
Mahoney and Thelen’s schema, this characterises him as a ‘subversive’, a type of agent they associate
with layering. Such agents are expected to work largely alone and ‘under the radar’, rather than seeking
alliances with internal or external critics of the institution. However, this is only partly true in the case
of the Technical Director. Initially, he did ﬁnd himself isolated, but in developing proposals for new
rules he had to build relationships with actors in external institutions, such as engineering staff in
DNOs and contacts in supply ﬁrms. Even more importantly, he sought to build an internal advocacy
coalition with the more pragmatic economists in the networks division of Ofgem, although not with
complete success.32
This last point relates to Campbell’s hypotheses about the use of ideas in institutional change.
Campbell argues that for ideas to bring about institutional change, there has to be a perceived crisis
or problem at senior levels in an organisation. To a large extent, this condition was  not present in the
Ofgem of the early 2000s in relation to innovation. While the Technical Director did identify a problem
of moribund R&D early on, mainly through contacts with engineering staff in DNOs that others in
31 Such as in setting the ‘X’ parameter that represents expected efﬁciency gains.
32 Interview 4.
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Ofgem did not have, he had to actively create perceptions of the problem inside the institution (and
only partly succeeded). Following this, the Technical Director effectively offered a ‘program’, i.e. a
speciﬁc cognitive idea about how to solve the problem, based on a particular view of the innovation
process. He was also able to offer some analysis (commissioned by an independent consultant) of its
effectiveness in lowering costs over time, but the case was based in part on the approach of trying
out a mechanism and then assessing it rather than on hard evidence of effectiveness.33 The challenge
of legitimacy in relation to public sentiment was  mainly about ensuring that the program did not
add unreasonable costs for consumers, a challenge that was  met  through aspects of the program
design. The more fundamental problem was that the program was  not consistent with the intellectual
paradigm that the dominant group of ‘purist’ economists were working within. This issue was never
fully resolved, and in the end an appeal to senior actors operating within a more pragmatic paradigm
was necessary.
This discussion points to the important implication that in any institutional setting, while there
may be paradigms that are dominant at any one time, there are also likely to be a number of alternative
paradigms (or varieties of the main paradigm) that institutional entrepreneurs can attempt to make
their programs consistent with. Certainly the story of IFI is not a neat one of making a new policy
ﬁt the dominant paradigm, but rather a messier one of attempting to confront a dominant paradigm
before seeking out consistency with an alternative at another level of governance.
Moving to the late 2000s, if senior managers in Ofgem did not perceive a crisis in network regulation
they did perceive a set of problems, including capital bias in spend, a poorly deﬁned regulatory contract
and a slowness of network companies to respond to new agendas and technological possibilities. These
actors also wanted to change the institutional rules without destroying the regulatory institution or
its core objectives, but while they could also be labelled ‘subversives’ in Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010)
sense, they were of sufﬁcient number and seniority that they had no need to work alone or ‘under
the radar’. A key reason for this was that the dominant economic paradigm in Ofgem had shifted
over the 2000s.34 A commitment to incentive regulation based on a simple belief in the power of cost
reduction had given way  to a more complex assessment, including the possibility of negative effects
on quality of service and on innovation. This latter point was reinforced by the evidence that support
mechanisms like the IFI could be effective in changing the levels of R&D undertaken by companies. A
program for a bigger bolder innovation support mechanism was therefore more consistent with what
had become a more pragmatic, less ‘purist’ paradigm and it was far easier to provide evidence of its
likely effectiveness. In fact, most of the work in the case of the LCNF went into developing in such a
way that it was consistent with public sentiments, i.e. that it should be constructed in such a way  that
it did not impose excessive risks and costs on energy consumers. With that gas and electricity prices
increasing sharply between 2002 and 2008, it is not surprising that public sentiment came to the fore
more strongly.
6. Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that the creation of protective space for innovation in electricity distribu-
tion networks in Britain over the 2000s is best seen as a political process involving gradual endogenous
change within the regulatory institution. This change has taken the form of the ‘layering’ of new formal
rules over existing ones, rather than displacement or informal drift. I have used a detailed account of
33 Evidence gathering is particularly problematic in the area of innovation, as it requires supply chain companies to share
insights about future products and their likely costs – both usually closely guarded types of information in a competitive
market. This challenge was met  by quite subtle means such as utilising the IET’s building for meetings (neutral ground and
a  ‘professional’ context), by key advocacy behind the scenes by vendor representatives who  saw the opportunity for positive
change by being willing to accept some commercial risk, and by independent consultants providing reassurances of anonymity
in  data gathering (interview 4).
34 Kern et al. (2014) argue, following Helm (2005) that a new energy paradigm became established over this period, because
of  shift away from liberalised markets to interventions on grounds of energy security and climate change mitigation. Here,
the  argument is that there was a shift within the nature of what remained a dominant paradigm of regulation based on a
neo-classical economic theory of incentives.
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how regulatory mechanisms for R&D and demonstration support were created to test two  explana-
tions of gradual change from the institutionalist literature. I have argued that this approach builds on
existing theoretical frameworks for understanding the politics of niche creation in the socio-technical
transitions school both by introducing more speciﬁc hypotheses about the nature of change and the
role of ideas in institutional change, and by allowing a greater focus on the nature and role of actors.
Mahoney and Thelen (2010) argue that layering will tend to be found where an institution has many
possibilities for veto in its political context, and where there is limited discretion in the implementa-
tion of rules. They also argue that layering will tend to be led by institutional entrepreneurs operating
largely alone and ‘under the radar’ rather than openly challenging institutional power structures. The
case of new R&D support mechanisms for electricity distribution networks provides some support
for these arguments. Ofgem’s high degree of discretion vis-a-vis government and other actors gives
it multiple veto possibilities, while rules for applying regulation cannot easily be bent. However, the
activities of the main institutional entrepreneur in the case of the early mechanisms (the Innovation
Funding Initiative and Registered Power Zones) only partly ﬁt the model. As Mahoney and Thelen’s
framework suggests, he sought to amend rather than overturn the regulatory framework. But contrary
to the expectations of the framework, he had to form alliances with a group of ‘pragmatists’ in the
regulatory organisation and its governing board, rather than working in isolation. With the second
and larger innovation mechanism in the late 2000s (the Low Carbon Network Fund), the key change
actors were senior managers, who proved to be simultaneously institutional incumbents and chal-
lengers. These ﬁndings imply that Mahoney and Thelen’s characterisation of change agents associated
with layering is too restrictive, and in particular does not accommodate the case where institutional
incumbents also seek to drive change.
Campbell (1998, 2004) focuses on the role of ideas in institutional change, arguing that new policy
‘programs’ are more likely to be accepted where a crisis or problem is perceived, where the program
is consistent with the dominant policy paradigm, and where is can be framed in such a way  that it
resonates with wider political narratives. In the case of the IFI and RPZs, the absence of innovation
by network companies was not perceived as a problem, and the key institutional change agent had
to work to build such a view within the organisation. His proposed program faced strong challenge
from the dominant ‘purist’ economic paradigm, but found sufﬁcient support from an alternative, more
pragmatic set of ideas in Ofgem’s governing body. Discursive theories of institutional change some-
times appear to conceive of single policy paradigms as monolithically dominant (e.g. Hall, 1993), but
in this case there were a number of different variants of economics which change agents drew on.
By the time that the LCNF was developed, the purist view had been moderated as attention shifted
from cost-cutting to investment and quality of service. Consistency of the program with the policy
paradigm was less of an issue than how the program resonated with public sentiment about energy
bills, since electricity prices had risen sharply since the early 2000s. This ﬁnding suggests that the
weight or importance of different types of ideas in determining the success of a new ‘program’ can
change over time.
In terms of the existing literature of the politics of niche creation and development, this analysis
conﬁrms the messy and conﬂictual nature of these processes. However, it also shows the particularities
of niche formation involved in an industry where returns are determined by a regulator. Both the
establishment of the IFI/RPZs and the later expansion of R&D under the LCNF conﬁrm Ulmanen et al.’s
(2009) and Smith and Raven’s (2012) emphasis on the importance of discourses or narratives, although
the account here provides more detail on the interrelationship between the ideas associated with the
niche, the wider perception of crisis, regime discourses, the nature of supporting evidence and the
ﬁt with wider public sentiment. Finally, the study adds a level of analysis linking ‘layering’ to certain
actor attributes and modes of operation. Since niche creation is effectively almost always likely to take
this form of institutional change, this additional dimension should be of use and interest to the study
of niche politics more widely.
The understanding of innovation processes within Ofgem has evolved over time but remains incom-
plete. The need for a regulatory support mechanism for R&D, and now demonstration, has not only
been recognised but apparently embraced. However, despite a shift away from a purist view of innova-
tion based on Austrian economics to a more nuanced approach, it remains the fact that the dominant
view (or hope) in Ofgem is that the incentive to reduce costs in the wider regulatory framework will
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now be sufﬁcient alone to drive network companies to take the lessons learned in LCNF trials and
apply them in business-as-usual network planning, investment and operation. Whether this is so,
or whether more assistance will be needed to persuade companies to cross what is the regulatory
equivalent of the ‘valley of death’, remains to be seen. And indeed, in a regulatory context the valley is
likely to be large, since unlike competitive contexts, niche markets cannot be used as an intermediate
step with further opportunities for learning and reﬁning between demonstration and mass deploy-
ment. The continuing absence of engineers (especially those with expertise in smart grid technologies)
in senior, policy-shaping roles in Ofgem also arguably hampers the regulator’s ability to negotiate a
period of complexity and disruptive change. More widely, the mechanisms so far developed by the
regulator have not been able to open up a space for institutional experimentation. Thus more radical
ideas for making networks more contestable, for example by allowing buy-outs of parts of networks
or the setting up of parallel networks and driving innovation through more direct competition were
rejected in the main regulatory review in 2009.
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Appendix A. Annex 1 – Interviews
The analysis in this paper is based in part on a number of face-to-face and telephone interviews
with distribution network stakeholders, regulators and ex-regulators conducted over the period July
2013 to October 2014. These interviews were carried out as part of a larger project on innovation
and the governance of electricity distribution networks in Britain. The interviews drawn on most
directly for this paper, especially the account of events given in Section 4, are listed below. Face-
to-face interviews were audio recorded (with exception of interview 5) and key points transcribed;
telephone interviews were recorded in note form. References to events and issues were cross checked
manually but not formally coded.
1. Independent consultant – 2 August 2013 (telephone interview)
2. Distribution network company senior engineer – 27 February 2014
3. Member of Ofgem Consumer Challenge Group – 5 August 2014
4. Independent consultant and former Ofgem senior manager – 15 September 2014
5. Ofgem senior manager – 6 October 2014
6. Ofgem senior manager – 6 October 2014 (telephone interview)
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